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Learning to Fail? 
Evidence from Frequent IPO Investors  
 
Abstract 
 
  
We examine how experience affects the decisions of individual investors and institutions in 
IPO auctions to bid in subsequent auctions, and their bidding returns. We track bidding 
histories for all 31,476 individual investors and 1,232 institutional investors across all 84 IPO 
auctions during 1995-2000 in Taiwan. For individual bidders: (1) high returns in previous IPO 
auctions increase the likelihood of participating in future auctions; (2) bidders’ returns decrease 
as they participate in more auctions; Regression results show that as experience increases by 
one standard deviation, the expected return decreases by 1.3% (1.8%) and the expected dollar 
profits decrease by NT$4,630 (7,360) for all individual investors (for individuals engaged in 
repeat bidding); (3) auction selection ability deteriorates with experience; and (4) bidders with 
greater experience bid more aggressively. These findings are consistent with naïve 
reinforcement learning wherein individuals become unduly optimistic after receiving good 
returns. In sharp contrast, there is little sign that institutional investors exhibit such behavior.      
 
 
 
JEL Classifications:  G15, G24, G32 
Keywords: IPO, auction, investor behavior, learning, reinforcement learning, institutional 
investor, individual investor, experience. 
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1. Introduction  
In the fields of economics and finance, there has been growing interest in the effects of 
experience on decision making. On the one hand, economic agents may learn through experience 
to make better decisions as they acquire better information about the environment or about the 
quality of their information signals (e.g., Arrow (1962), Grossman, Kihlstrom and Mirman 
(1977), Mahani and Bernhardt (2007), and Linnainmaa (2010)).  
On the other hand, there are psychological biases that can hamper the learning process, 
and which can even result in decision quality systematically deteriorating with increased 
experience. For example, there is evidence that people learn through naïve reinforcement, 
wherein they expect the gains or losses that they have personally experienced to recur, even in 
situations where such an expectation is not logically justified. In other words, they expect 
success in an endeavor to indicate favorable prospects for future success, while failure 
foreshadows future failure. Although a rational Bayesian may indeed draw such inferences to 
some extent, under naïve reinforcement learning individuals overweight their personal 
experience. For example, in evaluating future prospects they overweight personal experience 
relative to information obtained by communication with or observation of others (Cross (1973), 
Arthur (1991), Roth and Erev (1995), and Camerer and Ho (1999)).1    
 A good understanding of how investors learn is essential for modeling financial and 
economic decisions. In traditional economic models, economic agents are often assumed to solve 
complex decision problems flawlessly. A common justification for this approach is that in 
repeated settings individuals eventually learn to play correct strategies. However if learning does 
                                                 
1 One possible explanation for over-extrapolation of past gains or losses into the future is the representativeness 
heuristic, and the resulting ‘law of small numbers’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1971). Under this effect, a small sample 
observed from past experience is viewed as representative of the underlying probability distribution, and therefore is 
overweighted.  
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not improve decision-making, this conclusion is not justified. It is therefore important to examine 
evidence from a variety of settings to determine in what contexts individuals are able to learn 
their way out of bias, and in what contexts learning exacerbates bias. 
In this paper, we explore whether investors learn to improve their strategies through 
experience (rational learning), or whether experience causes them to invest less effectively 
(naïve reinforcement learning). To do so, we use a dataset with complete bid information for all 
the 84 IPO auctions during 1995-2000 in Taiwan. We are able to track the bidding histories of 
31,476 individual investors and 1,232 institutional investors during that period.  
The fact that this dataset includes the first IPO auction in Taiwan and all the IPO auctions 
during 1995-2000 is important for studying the effects of experience, because it provides the 
complete bidding history of all bidders prior to each IPO auction.  Furthermore, this data include 
large numbers of both individual and institutional investors. As a result, we are able to explore 
whether past experience influences investors with different degrees of sophistication in different 
ways. 
We hypothesize that under both types of learning, investors are more likely to bid in 
future IPO auctions if they received high returns from past auctions.  However, rational learning 
will lead to improved bidding strategies and hence better return performance, while naïve 
reinforcement learning will lead to deterioration in bidding strategies and therefore worse return 
performance (see Section 2 for detailed hypothesis development).  
We first examine the relationship between an investor’s past returns from previous IPO 
auctions and her inclination to participate in a future IPO auction. We find that individual 
investors tend to bid in the future if they received high past returns and tend to stop bidding if 
they received poor past returns. In sharp contrast, we find that the decisions of institutional 
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investors to bid are much less, if at all, influenced by their past returns. 
To differentiate between the rational and naïve reinforcement learning hypotheses, we 
examine investors’ return performance as they gain more experience. Consistent with the naïve 
reinforcement learning hypothesis, we find that individual investors’ returns steadily decrease as 
they gain more experience.  Regression results show that as experience increases by one standard 
deviation, the expected return decreases by 1.3% (1.8%) and the expected dollar profits decrease 
by NT$4,630 (7,360) for the sample of all individual investors (for individuals engaged in repeat 
bidding). 2 In contrast, institutional investors’ returns do not decrease, so there is no indication 
that institutional investors are subject to naïve reinforcement learning. 
The effect of experience on returns can reflect changes in two kinds of bidding skills 
needed for investors to achieve good returns from participating in IPO auctions (Sherman 2005, 
Chiang, Qian and Sherman 2009): the ability to judge firm quality (i.e., auction selection), and 
the ability to shave bids sufficiently (to address the winner’s curse and to compensate for 
information costs). We therefore investigate how each of these skills changes as investors learn 
from experience.  
For individual investors, we find that auction selection ability deteriorates with 
experience, and that experience causes greater aggressiveness in bid prices. So the decline in 
individual investor returns with experience reflects a failure of learning for both kinds of skills. 
For institutional investors, however, neither of these bidding skills deteriorates with experience.   
Finally, we investigate whether in the long run individual investors ever start to learn 
more effectively from experience. There is some indication  that given long enough experience 
(at least 24 auctions in our tests), individual investors start to benefit from experience. This is 
                                                 
2  All NT$ values in the paper are in constant year 2000 NT$’s.  The end of 2000 exchange rate was US$1 = 
NT$32.99.  
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quite a lot of experience, however, and only a very small proportion (0.2%) of individual 
investors in our sample achieve that level of experience.  
  This study therefore makes two contributions to the learning literature. First, we provide 
evidence that individual investors in IPO auctions are subject to naïve reinforcement learning. 
The decline in their performance with experience is not consistent with rational Bayesian 
learning. Second, we document that a potentially more sophisticated set of players, institutional 
investors, do not seem to be subject to this learning bias.  
Our paper is far from the first to address the issue of how decision-makers learn from 
experience. Several studies examine learning in laboratory experiments (Erev and Roth (1998), 
Camerer and Ho (1999), and Charness and Levin (2005)). Using survey data, Malmendier and 
Nagel (2009) document that individuals’ expectations about future inflation rates are largely 
influenced by their own experiences of inflation, consistent with reinforcement learning.  
Other papers have studied effects of learning using actual trading and asset allocation 
data. Consistent with the rational-learning hypothesis, Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Dhar and 
Zhu (2006) find that investors’ trading experience reduces the behavioral bias of the disposition 
effect. Nicolosi, Peng and Zhu (2009) and Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2009) present evidence 
that individual investors learn from trading experience and improve performance. On the other 
hand, consistent with reinforcement learning, Barber, Odean, and Strahilevetz (2010) document 
that investors tend to repurchase stocks they previously sold for a gain and shun stocks they 
previously sold for a loss. Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2009) find that an investor’s 
401(K) contribution rate increases more if her account has recently experienced a high return or 
low return variance, and that such behavior is not welfare-improving.3 These papers all focus on 
                                                 
3 There is evidence consistent with biased learning for other market participants: Billett and Qian (2008) find that 
CEOs that frequently engage in acquiring other firms see more negative wealth effects in their later deals while their 
 5
individual investors. A distinctive aspect of our paper is that we examine whether individual 
versus institutional investors differ in how they react to past experience and in their abilities to 
improve their performance. 
Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) provide evidence suggesting that individual investors are 
more likely to participate in IPOs after good returns from past IPOs. This evidence is valuable in 
documenting that belief updating about IPO investment does occur in response to experience. 
However, their tests are not able to distinguish the key alternative hypotheses of our paper — 
whether investors rationally learn to improve their profits, or whether investors update naively, 
and thereby ‘learn to fail’. Although the authors interpret their results as consistent with naïve 
reinforcement learning, their evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that investors learn 
rationally. If investors learn about their investing abilities (or the accuracy of their information 
signals) through experience, then those who have high abilities will continue more often than 
those with low abilities (Mahani and Bernhardt 2007, Seru, Shumway and Stoffman 2009), 
consistent with Kaustia and Knupfer’s finding. 
There are two key differences between our paper and that of Kaustia and Knupfer. First, 
by examining performance over time, we assess whether investors are engaged in rational 
learning, or are ‘learning to fail’ through naive reinforcement learning. The IPO auctions in our 
sample are discriminatory price auctions, i.e. bidders pay what they bid when they win. This 
implies that winning bidders will receive different initial returns even from the same auction. 
These auctions therefore provide a great deal of relevant information for exploring the effects of 
personal experience on returns. In contrast, Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) use data from offerings 
                                                                                                                                                             
insider trading prior to those deals become more bullish. Hilary and Menzly (2006) find that analysts who have 
predicted earnings more accurately in the recent past tend to be less accurate and further from the consensus in 
subsequent earnings predictions, although there are mixed results regarding the effect of long-term experience on 
analyst forecast accuracy (See Mikhail, Walther and Williams (1997) and Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999)). 
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in which retail investors play no price-setting role, since they choose only whether or not to order 
shares. All investors pay the same offer price and receive the same initial returns from the same 
IPO.  
Second, Kaustia and Knupfer focus on individual investors, whereas we test whether 
individual and institutional investors differ in their abilities to learn valid lessons from past 
experience. An added advantage of our dataset is that, in contrast with IPOs that use 
bookbuilding or fixed price public offer methods, underwriters in IPO auctions have no 
discretion over either pricing or allocation. Thus, our study is not complicated by the interfering 
effects of underwriter discretion.  
Our findings also have implications for IPO design. Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009) 
document that institutional investors are informed bidders with sophisticated bidding strategies, 
while individual investors are not. The authors thus raise the question of whether individual 
investors as a group have the sophistication to price highly risky securities such as IPO stocks. 
Our paper differs in studying how different kinds of investors learn from experience in IPO 
auctions. Furthermore, there is little or no sign in our evidence that experience with the IPO 
auction method makes individuals better investors in IPO auctions. This raises the question of 
whether regulatory protections are needed for individual investors participating in IPO auctions.4 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The model of Sherman (2005) gives the optimal bidding strategy in an IPO environment 
in which investors decide whether and how to participate in a multiple unit sealed bid common 
                                                 
4  Jagannathan, Jirnyi and Sherman (2010) offer further evidence regarding the computational challenges involved in 
bidding in IPO auctions, and point out that unsophisticated bidders following suboptimal bidding strategies increase 
risk even for sophisticated bidders. 
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value auction.5  In the model, bidders decide whether or not to incur a fixed cost to acquire 
information about the offering. Upon receiving a signal, bidders decide how much to bid.  
In equilibrium it is unprofitable to bid without acquiring information. Bidders follow a 
mixed information acquisition (entry) strategy, randomizing between obtaining information and 
then bidding, or simply avoiding the auction entirely. Bidders enter to the point where on 
average they just recover their evaluation costs. Having observed their information signals, those 
that enter follow mixed strategies in choosing the levels of their bids. Bid levels reflect a balance 
between the costs and benefits of a higher bid (higher chance of winning, but lower expected 
return to winning), so that a bidder has the same overall expected return from any bid within the 
equilibrium range. However, if an investor receives a signal value so low that the preferred bid 
level is below the auction reservation price, the investor does not bid. In equilibrium, bidders 
shave their bids relative to their true valuations, in part to compensate for the winner’s curse.  
In this approach bidders know how much they should rely on their private signals relative 
to public signals (i.e., they know their own signal precision), so there is no scope for a bidder to 
learn through personal experience. If we consider this setting repeated each period without 
learning, we do not expect to see systematic trends in bidder behavior or performance (such as 
expected returns and bidding strategies) in relation to bidder experience. 
 We consider a rational hypothesis that allows for bidder learning by modifying the 
environment described above to allow for uncertainty about how much a bidder should rely on 
her private signals. Under rational Bayesian updating, investors learn over time how much to 
                                                 
5 Sherman (2005) models both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. In a discriminatory auction, all winning 
bidders pay the price that they bid.  In a uniform price or “Dutch” auction, all bidders pay the same price. Although 
in this paper we examine a discriminatory auction sample, the hypotheses we develop also apply to uniform price 
auctions such as those done in the United States. The scenario we discuss differs from the Sherman model in 
allowing for a reservation price, so that a bidder with sufficiently low signal value finds it unprofitable to bid. This 
allows us to consider how rational learning affects auction selection. 
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trust their private signals relative to public information and adjust the weight they give to their 
private signals when updating their expectations. Each investor begins with a prior about the 
firm’s value based on public information. The degree to which she updates her prior upon 
receiving her private signals depends on the perceived accuracy of the signal. As an investor 
observes her bidding outcomes over time, she rationally updates her estimate of her signal 
accuracy, which affects how much weight she places upon her signal relative to public 
information. 
 In this framework, an investor rationally infers that her signal is on average more 
accurate if she received high returns from previous IPO auctions. Placing undue weight on 
inaccurate signals is unprofitable, because she is very likely to ‘win’ low-value shares when she 
bids too high, and is unlikely to win high-value shares when she bids too low.    
Sherman (2005) shows that, all else equal, the equilibrium entry probability is higher if 
the signal is more accurate. Intuitively, a more accurate signal, ceteris paribus, increases the 
expected benefit of entering. Higher returns to a bidder in past auctions cause a rational inference 
that her signals are accurate. Thus, investors are more likely to bid in future auctions if they 
receive higher returns from past auctions. 
Consider next an alternative scenario in which investors are subject to naïve 
reinforcement learning. Such investors update their beliefs about their prospects in an investment 
domain (e.g., investments in IPO auctions) as an increasing function of their past success in this 
domain, regardless of whether or not such updating is logically justified. Thus they are also more 
likely to bid again in future auctions if they receive higher returns from past auctions. 
In summary, we have the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1  –  If investors learn from experience, either by rational Bayesian 
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updating or naïve reinforcement learning, those that receive higher returns from 
past auctions are more likely to continue to place bids in future auctions. 
 
We therefore expect investors to bid more when they have higher past returns, regardless of 
whether they are institutional or individual investors.   
 However, these two types of learning offer very different predictions about the relation of 
bidding experience to future return performance and auction selection ability. Under rational 
Bayesian updating, those who bid again (i.e. experienced bidders) tend to be those who rationally 
learn that their signals are likely to be of high accuracy. In consequence, such bidders will 
rationally place greater weight on their signals. Experienced bidders thus tend to have more 
accurate posterior expectations than inexperienced bidders. Greater precision improves decision 
accuracy and expected returns (Sherman 2005). So expected returns should also increase with 
experience.  
 Furthermore, a bidder’s expected profits depend on two factors: auction selection ability 
and bid aggressiveness (whether she shaves her bids adequately). To evaluate selection ability, a 
measure is needed of the quality of the investment opportunity in a given auction. An IPO 
auction’s average initial return measures the average profits to auction investors, and is therefore 
an ex post proxy for the quality of the auction as an investment opportunity. Furthermore, 
Sherman (2005) shows that when investors are informed and bidding optimally, on average the 
IPO initial return is an increasing function of firm quality, because in equilibrium there is partial 
adjustment of the auction issue price to information.  
We refine this proxy by measuring bidder i’s auction selection ability as the value-
weighted average return to other bidders in an auction in which bidder i bids. Since all winning 
bidders pay what they bid, other bidders’ average return depends on the quality of the IPO 
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(which is what selection ability is about) and not on how aggressively investor i bids in those 
auctions in which she participates.  
Under rational updating, as bidders gain experience they learn their information precision 
more accurately, which allows them to form more accurate posterior beliefs and therefore to 
select auctions more accurately. We therefore predict that greater experience is also associated 
with high subsequent returns to other bidders who participate in the same subsequent auctions as 
bidder i. 
Hypothesis 2  –  If investors are learning by rational Bayesian updating, then as 
the experience of a bidder increases: 
a)  the bidder’s expected return will increase; and 
b)  the expected returns of other bidders who participate in the same subsequent 
auctions as the given bidder will also increase. 
  
 Alternatively, if investors are subject to naïve reinforcement learning, they become 
unduly optimistic about firm quality and the IPO expected return following higher returns to past 
auctions. Such optimism has two consequences. First, investors are more likely to bid in all 
offerings, include low-value offerings. In other words, they become less selective regarding 
which auctions to participate in. This poorer selection ability implies lower expected returns to 
other bidders participating in the same subsequent auctions as the given bidder. Second, when 
they bid, they tend to offer higher prices. In other words, their bids will be more aggressive.6 
Both consequences contribute to lower expected returns to the bidder. 
 
                                                 
6  Intuitively, under rational Bayesian learning, experience tends to be associated with placing more weight on one’s 
private signals, because bidders who rationally place less weight on their private signals are less likely to continue 
bidding. Placing more weight on one’s private signals leads to a wider spread of expected values (higher for good 
signals, lower for bad signals) relative to the prior expected value before the signal was received. Bids for the lowest 
value shares are less likely to be placed at all, since the optimal bid is more likely to be below the reservation price, 
meaning that the average bid that is placed is likely to be higher. Thus rational Bayesian learning will tend to lead to 
more aggressive bidding with experience. However, optimal bid-shaving depends on the level of the signal and is 
generally greater for higher signals, which can also affect the relation of optimal bidding aggressiveness to 
experience. It is not clear whether the net effect will lead the optimal bidding aggressiveness to increase or decrease 
with experience under rational learning. 
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Hypothesis 3 – If investors are engaged in naïve reinforcement learning, then as 
the experience of a bidder increases: 
a)  the bidder’s expected return will decrease;  
b)  the expected returns of other bidders who participate in the same subsequent auctions 
     as the given bidder will also decrease; and 
c)  the bidder’s bids will become more aggressive. 
 
Therefore, rational Bayesian learning predicts an increasing relation between a bidder’s 
expected return and experience, whereas naïve reinforcement learning predicts a decreasing 
relation. Moreover, rational learning predicts that the returns to other bidders participating in the 
same auctions will increase, while naïve reinforcement learning predicts that the returns to others 
in the same auctions will decrease, and also that the investor’s bids will become more aggressive 
with experience. To test these hypotheses, we will examine how auction outcomes vary as a 
function of the experience of the bidder. 
 
3. Data and Sample 
3.1 IPO auctions in Taiwan 
IPO auctions in Taiwan are multiple-unit, multiple-bid discriminatory-price sealed-bid 
auctions. A bidder can submit multiple bids (different combinations of price and quantity) and 
will pay what he bid if he wins.7 Both individuals and institutions can participate in these IPO 
auctions. A bidder is allowed to win no more than 6% of the auction shares, which for an average 
auction is NT$58.0 million at the average winning price.  Institutions bid in all but two of the 
auctions in our sample. 
Bidders submit sealed bids during a pre-announced bid-tender period which lasts for 4 
business days. At the time of submitting bids, investors need to pay a transaction fee of NT$500 
                                                 
7 IPO auctions in Taiwan are a hybrid IPO method – half of the IPO shares are to be sold in an auction, and then the 
other half of the shares are to be sold in a subsequent fixed-price public offer. Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009) 
show that there are no strategic interaction between the two stages and they are essentially two independent sales 
from investors’ point of view.  Hence we focus only on auctions in this paper. 
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for each bid and a bid deposit that is no less than 20% of the bid size (i.e., bid price times bid 
quantity). During the bid-tender period, underwriters are not allowed to open the sealed bids and 
are explicitly forbidden from revealing bid information (Taiwan Securities Association Rules 
Governing Underwriting and Resale of Securities by Securities Firms, Article 14). By 9:00 A.M. 
on the morning after the auction closes, the bid log is delivered to the Taiwan Securities 
Association, where the bids are opened and allocations are determined. We call this date the 
auction date.   
The clearing price is the maximum bid price that clears the supply.  All bids that are 
strictly above the clearing price are filled in full, while bids at the clearing price are awarded by 
lottery. Bidding results including the clearing price, subscription ratio, and winning price and 
quantity for each winner are then announced.  Information on losing bids is not made publicly 
available (but is available in our data).  
Shares are seldom able to trade freely during their first official day on the aftermarket, 
due to limits on daily price changes.  In Taiwan, a daily return limit of 7% in each direction is 
imposed on all publicly traded stocks, including IPO shares, during our sample period.  IPO 
shares frequently hit this limit for the first few days in a row.  The first day when the stock price 
falls within the limit is known as the first non-hit day. We compute an investors’ initial return (or 
IPO underpricing) based on the closing price of the first non-hit day. This initial return is 
comparable to an IPO’s first-day return in the US, where IPOs do not face daily price limits. In 
our sample, the ‘honeymoon period’ (the time from the first trading day to the first non-hit day) 
has a mean (median) of 5.4 (3) trading days and ranges between 1 and 28 trading days. For more 
institutional details on IPO auctions in Taiwan, see Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009). 
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3.2 Sample 
The sample includes all the 84 IPO auctions in Taiwan during 1995-2000. 8  We obtain 
detailed bidding information on each auction from the Taiwan Securities Association, including 
bidder IDs and the bid price and quantity of every bid by each bidder. The format of the bidder 
ID tells us whether the bidder is an institutional or individual investor. A bidder uses the same ID 
across auctions and therefore the dataset allows us to track the bidding history of each bidder. 
The dataset also includes information on the auction size, the reservation price, the clearing price 
and the auction proceeds.  
Background information about the IPO firms such as assets, venture capital ownership 
and P/E ratio are collected from the firms’ prospectuses, which are available from the Taiwan 
Securities & Futures Information Center database. Stock returns for individual stocks and the 
market are from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). 
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the sample.  Panel A reports firm characteristics. 
The average IPO firm has assets of NT$10.4 billion and raises NT$880.6 million in the auction. 
Panel B reports the means of IPO initial returns and numbers of bidders for the whole sample 
period and by year. We compute the initial return for each auction as the closing price on the first 
non-hit day over the quantity-weighted average winning price minus one, i.e., the value-weighted 
average initial returns of all winning bidders. We also compute the average initial return in each 
auction separately for individuals and institutions. The mean IPO initial return over the sample 
period is 7.3%. On average, 676.8 individuals and 32.0 institutions bid in each IPO auction.  
Not surprisingly, the mean return for individual investors is very close to that for the 
whole sample since most bidders are individuals. Institutional investors on average earn higher 
                                                 
8 There are seven IPO auctions that came after 2000 – three in 2001, two in 2002, one in 2003 and one in 2008.  Bid 
data for these auctions are not available due to the new privacy policy of the Taiwan Securities Association.  
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returns, with a mean return of 8.7% vs. 7.2% for individuals. The time-series variations in returns 
are similar for individual and institutional investors. There is no obvious time-trend for investor 
participation.  
Panels C and D report bidder activities and returns. Unlike in Panels A and B, where each 
IPO auction is one observation, in Panel C (D) we treat each auction-bidder (each unique bidder) 
as an observation. There are 31,467 (1,232) unique individual (institutional) bidders with 56,849 
(2,687) bidder-auction observations. Of these, there are 16,037 (971) winning individual 
(institutional) bidder-auction combinations for which returns can be calculated. The average 
individual bid size (i.e., sum of bid price times bid quantity across a bidder’s bids) is $2.3 million 
and investment size (i.e., sum of bid price times winning quantity across a bidder’s winning bids) 
is $2.8 million. In comparison, the average institutional bid size is $23.1 million and investment 
size is $28.3 million. Individual investors earn a mean (median) initial return of 5.5% (0%), 
whereas institutional investors earn a mean (median) initial return of 11.5% (4.6%). All the 
differences are significant at the 1% level. 
Despite the positive mean (nonnegative median) returns, investments in these IPOs are 
very risky. The standard deviation of returns is 22.8% for individual investors and 26.1% for 
institutional investors. Individual investors’ returns range from -50.0% to 110.6%, and 
institutional investors’ returns from -33.8% to 110.6%. Individual investors receive positive 
returns only 49.4% of the time and institutional investors 64.1% of the time.  
Panel D examines bidder activities and returns at the unique bidder level, i.e., we first 
average across auctions for each bidder, and then average across bidders. The average individual 
investor participates (i.e., bids) in 1.8 auctions and wins shares in 0.5 auctions; the average 
institutional investor participates in 2.2 auctions and wins shares in 0.8 auctions. The differences 
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in bid size and investment size between individuals and institutions are similar to those in Panel 
C. For bidding results, we calculate each bidder’s value-weighted return and average dollar 
profits. The contrast in returns between individuals and institutions is even more striking than 
that in Panel C. The median value-weighted return for individuals is negative (-3.4%). In terms 
of the mean (median) dollar profits per auction, institutions earn NT$1.1 (NT$0.3) million higher 
profits than individuals, with the difference significant at the 10% (1%) level. The large 
difference between the mean and median profits suggests that dollar profits are highly skewed.  
Most investors in our sample (74.8% of individuals and 66.5% of institutions) bid in only 
one auction. The proportion of investors bidding in two auctions is 11.7% for individuals and 
11.9% for institutions. The proportion of investors bidding in three or more auctions is 13.5% for 
individuals and 21.6% for institutions. However, bidders with two or more auctions account for 
60.1% of all bidder-auction observations.9  
 
4. Past returns and the likelihood of participating in further auctions 
We test Hypothesis 1 by examining the relationship between a bidder’s past returns and 
her likelihood of bidding again. We first perform a two-subsample analysis similar to that of 
Kaustia and Knupfer (2008). We divide the sample into two subsamples with similar numbers of 
winning bidder-auction observations, and investigate whether returns received in the first half 
affect a bidder’s likelihood of bidding in the second half. The first half of the sample includes 44 
(out of 84) auctions and 8,442 (out of 17,008) winning bidder-auction observations. We compute 
a bidder’s return in the first half as the investment-weighted average of her returns from all the 
auctions for which she wins shares during that period.  
                                                 
9 As will be discussed later, due to the time overlaps of some auctions, bidders might have multiple first auctions.  In 
other words, a bidder may have two auctions but both auctions may be defined as her first auction.  Bidders with 2nd 
or later auctions count for 50.4% of all bidder-auction observations. 
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Table 2 Panel A reports the probability of bidding in the second half for each quartile of 
returns in the first half, for individual and institutional investors respectively.10 Individual bidders 
are more likely to bid in the second half if they receive higher returns in the first half. The 
probability of bidding again in the second half jumps from 29.8% in the lowest return quartile 
(mean return of -8.9%) to 38.5% in the 2nd quartile (mean return of 5.3%), and increases to 
41.9% in the 3rd quartile (mean return of 17.8%). It then levels off at 40.0% in the 4th quartile 
(mean return of 47.9%). Thus, the difference between a positive and negative return seems to 
have a major impact on the decisions of individual investors to bid again. Higher positive returns 
also encourage bidding again, but the marginal effect seems to be decreasing.   
This pattern, however, does not apply to institutional investors. Institutions, on average, 
have a higher tendency to bid again than individuals. However, there is no relationship between 
past returns and the probability of bidding in the 2nd half. The probability of bidding in the 2nd 
half is 46.3%, 37.8%, 43.9% and 47.3% for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th return quartiles, respectively.  
 Different investors may have different propensities to bid (even apart from past returns). 
To control for this, we look at bidders with different numbers of auctions in the first half 
separately. Table 2 Panel B shows the bidding probability by return quartiles for bidders with 
one, two, and three or more auctions. We find that bidders with more auctions in the first half 
indeed are more likely to bid again in the second half, holding return quartile fixed. Nonetheless, 
for each bidder category, past returns still have a large positive effect on individual investors’ 
decision to participate in future auctions.  For individual investors with any number of auctions 
in the first half, their bidding probability in the 2nd half steadily increases across return quartiles. 
In contrast, for institutional investors in each auction-number group, we do not observe such a 
                                                 
10 Although we examine individual and institutional investors’ probability of bidding separately, the return quartiles 
are determined for all bidders together. 
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relationship between past returns and bidding probabilities.  
 Table 3 reports logit regressions that test whether past returns affect the likelihood of 
bidding again. In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the bidder bids 
again in the 2nd half of the sample. The regressor of interest is a bidder’s past return in the first 
half. We control for the number of auctions in which she participates in the first half.  
Specifically, we use the natural log of one plus the number of auctions.11 The coefficient on this 
variable is significantly positive in regressions for both individual and institutional investors, 
suggesting that this variable is a good indicator of the bidder’s inherent propensity to bid.  
 Consistent with the univariate tests, the coefficient on past return is significantly positive 
for individuals, but not significant for institutions. For individual investors, when the past return 
moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile holding the control variable at its mean, the 
probability of bidding increases from 32.3% to 39.1%. 
 In addition to the two-subsample analysis in Panel A, we perform additional logit 
regression analyses in Panels B and C that include all winning bidder-auction observations, 
except for those of the last two auctions since there are no future auctions after them in our 
sample. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the bidder ever bids again 
in the sample after winning the current auction and zero otherwise. Past return is a bidder’s 
investment-weighted average return up through the current auction. Results are qualitatively 
similar to those in Panel A: for individual investors, the coefficient on past return is significantly 
positive; for institutional investors, the coefficient is insignificant.   
 In Panel C, we define the dependent variable to be equal to one if the bidder bids in the 
next auction and zero otherwise. In addition to the bidder’s number of past auctions, we control 
                                                 
11 For robustness checks, we also use dummies for the number of auctions.  The main conclusions are robust.  
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for the auction and market characteristics related to the next auction.12 The main conclusions, that 
past return positively predicts bidding again for individuals but not institutions, are the same as 
before.    
 In summary, we find that for the IPO auctions in our sample, individual investors’ 
bidding decisions are significantly influenced by their returns from previous IPO auctions. This 
is consistent with the findings in Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) for individual investors in fixed-
price IPO offerings. This evidence is consistent with both rational learning and naïve 
reinforcement learning. We further find, in sharp contrast, that institutional investors’ bidding 
decisions are not affected by their own past returns.  
 
5. Bidder experience and returns 
We now perform tests to disentangle whether the responsiveness of individual investors 
to past returns reflects rational learning or naïve reinforcement learning. To do so, we examine 
whether the bidder’s return performance in subsequent IPO auctions increases with experience 
(Hypothesis 2A) or decrease with experience (Hypothesis 3A).   
 
5.1 Univariate Tests 
We use auction order to measure bidding experience.  Each bidder-auction is assigned an 
auction order.  An auction is a bidder’s 1st (2nd, 3rd, etc.) auction if the bidder has 0 (1, 2, etc.) 
previous IPO auctions. Thus, auction order is a bidder’s number of past auctions plus one. A 
given auction may be one bidder’s 3rd auction but another bidder’s 1st auction. An auction is 
counted as a previous auction if its first non-hit day occurs before the current auction’s auction 
                                                 
12 Control variables are similar to those in the entry test (their Table 3) of Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009). For 
variable definitions, see the appendix. 
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date (so that we can compute the initial return from the previous auction).13  
To examine bidder returns as auction order increases, Table 4 reports the mean (and 
median) return of bidders in their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and higher-order auctions. Panel A reports 
results for the entire sample. For individual bidders, returns in general decrease when investors’ 
auction order increases from 2nd to subsequent auctions. We test the significance of the 
differences in returns for 2nd vs. 1st, 3rd vs. 2nd, 4th vs. 3rd, 5th vs. 4th, and higher-order vs. 5th 
auctions. The differences are significantly negative for 3rd vs. 2nd, 4th vs. 3rd and higher-order vs. 
5th auctions. These results suggest that individual investors’ returns tend to deteriorate with 
experience in bidding.14 Table 4 Panel B reports the mean (and median) returns of bidders 
excluding the outlier auction described in footnote 14. With this exclusion, for individual 
investors, the average return for 2nd auctions is significantly lower than for 1st auctions, and again 
returns steadily decrease as the auction order increases. These findings indicate that greater 
bidding experience is associated with worse return performance. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3A based upon naïve reinforcement learning, and inconsistent with the predictions of 
Hypothesis 2a based upon rational learning.15 
                                                 
13 Under this definition, a bidder may have multiple auctions that have the same auction order, for example if a 
bidder participates in a total of 3 auctions, and for the first two, the periods from auction date to first non-hit day 
overlap partially.  In this case, the bidder’s auctions have the following auction order respectively: 1st, 1st and 3rd.     
14 A notable exception is that the average return for 2nd auctions is significantly higher than for 1st auctions. This 
particular result, however, is driven entirely by one outlier auction – Chung Hwa Telecom, which is a privatization 
of a state-owned company and the biggest IPO in Taiwan ever (including other IPO methods). Chung Hwa has an 
asset value of NT$443.1 billion compared to NT$10.4 billion for the average IPO firm in our sample and it raises 
NT$22.7 billion compared to the average NT$0.9 billion. It also attracts the highest number of bidders: 4,286 
compared to an average of 708.7 bidders, among whom 4,240 (98.9%) are first-time bidders.  In addition, all bidders 
in this case won shares and all of them received negative returns ranging from -37.6% to -3.4%. Not surprisingly, 
inclusion of this auction greatly reduces the mean return of first-time bidders. 
15 Although steadily declining, returns remain positive even in individual bidders’ sixth or higher-order auctions: the 
mean (median) return is 14.2% (10.0%) for 1st auctions and 2.5% (1.6%) for 6th and higher-order auctions. 
However, declining returns are inconsistent with rational learning.  Moreover, the slightly positive returns for 
individual bidders’ high-order auctions do not necessarily mean that these investors benefit from participating in 
more auctions. According to IPO auction theory, positive returns are required to compensate for information and 
participation costs (Sherman (2005)).  It is unclear whether the returns these experienced bidders receive are 
adequate compensation for these costs.   
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 As for institutional investors, returns are much more stable across auction orders. Table 4 
Panel B shows that the differences in the mean returns are all insignificant for 3rd vs. 2nd, 4th vs. 
3rd, 5th vs. 4th, and higher-order vs. 5th. The only exception is that the mean return for 2nd auctions 
is significantly lower than for 1st auctions. For median returns, none of the differences are 
significant. Taken together with the previous result that institutions’ bidding probability is not 
significantly influenced by their past returns, our findings suggest that institutions’ bidding 
decisions (whether to bid and how high to bid) depend much less on their own experience.  
To ensure that the declining returns across auction orders are indeed due to differences in 
bidding experience rather than differences in the characteristics of bidders who engage in 
different numbers of auctions, we compute a bidder’s own change in returns across auctions. 
Table 5 reports the means and medians of change in returns for 2nd vs. 1st, 3rd vs. 2nd, 4th vs. 3rd, 
5th vs. 4th and higher-order vs. 5th auctions. Results are consistent with those in Table 4. For 
individual investors, their changes in returns are significantly negative for 2nd vs. 1st, 3rd vs. 2nd, 
and 4th vs. 3rd auctions. For institutional investors, the changes are all insignificant except for 2nd 
vs. 1st auctions. This effect suggests that even institutions might develop some undue optimism 
after experiencing one good return and bid more aggressively, but if so, unlike individual 
investors, they quickly learn to avoid any additional ‘learning to fail.’   
In summary, we find that individual returns steadily decline as they gain more 
experience, consistent with Hypothesis 3A implied by naïve reinforcement learning.  In sharp 
contrast, there is little evidence that institutions are subject to such naïve learning.   
An alternative explanation for the evidence that returns decrease for individuals as they 
gain bidding experience is that the average auction returns happen to decrease over time during 
our sample period. However, several data oppose this. First, the average returns from auctions do 
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not steadily decrease. As can be seen in Table 1 Panel B, the average bidder performs best in the 
year 1996, which is immediately followed by a bad year in 1997. A similar mini-cycle is 
repeated in 1999 and 2000. Second, this argument does not explain why institutional returns 
across auction orders do not exhibit the same pattern. The time-series pattern of the average 
institutional return is very similar to that of the individuals. Finally, we performed robustness 
checks by excluding the 4 auctions with the highest and lowest average returns, or excluding 
auctions in year 2000 (in which most auctions have negative average returns; overall it is the 
worst year during the sample period). The results are similar to those in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
5.2 Multivariate Tests    
 It is important to verify whether our conclusions are robust to controlling for other factors 
that may affect returns. We therefore run regressions of bidders’ returns on the experience 
variable, natural log of auction order, and a set of controls based on those in Chiang, Qian and 
Sherman (2009). We control for the following firm-specific characteristics: firm size measured 
as the natural logarithm of assets, VC ownership in the firm, P/E ratio measured as the auction’s 
reservation price over earnings per share, % of shares auctioned, a dummy equal to one if the 
firm is in a high-tech industry, and a dummy equal to one if the firm is traded on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange (TSE) as opposed to on the OTC. To control for market conditions, we include 
market volatility in the three months prior to the auction, and recent auction return computed as 
the weighted average of the returns of previous IPO auctions with weights based on (720-N), 
where N is the number of days between a previous auction’s first non-hit day and the recent 
auction’s auction day, as well as year dummies.16, 17   
                                                 
16 The return of an IPO auction refers to the value-weighted average return of all winning bidders in the auction. 
17  We lose the first two auctions in our sample for including the variable recent auction return.  We lose the second 
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We also include unexpected entry (i.e., unexpected number of bidders) of institutions and 
individuals and the average bid premium of institutions and individuals.18 Based on the auction 
model of Sherman (2005), Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009) argue that if a group of bidders bid 
optimally based on information, they will be more likely to bid and will bid higher when the 
expected return is higher. On the other hand, if a group of bidders are uninformed and follow a 
suboptimal bidding strategy, then a higher number of these participants and/or their higher bids 
will lead to lower returns for all bidders. Hence, unexpected entry and bid premia can reflect 
either private information or investor sentiment about the IPO. The unexpected entry and bid 
premium variables could also reflect other public information not captured by the other controls.  
To ensure that our results are not driven by the specific form of the unexpected entry 
measures, in unreported tests we used raw entry instead of unexpected entry. Alternatively, we 
excluded unexpected entry and bid premium of institutions and individuals from the tests. The 
findings are similar using either of these alternative sets of control variables.  
 Table 6 reports the results for regressions estimated separately for individual and 
institutional investors, and for all bidders versus frequent bidders, where frequent bidders are 
those whose highest auction order is greater than one. In each regression, we compute t-statistics 
with standard errors adjusted for auction clustering and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients on 
the control variables are consistent with those of Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009) – both 
individual and institutional returns increase with the unexpected entry and average bid premium 
of institutions, and decrease with unexpected entry and average bid premium of individuals, 
which they interpret as evidence that institutional investors bid based on information and shave 
                                                                                                                                                             
auction because its auction date occurred before the first IPO shares began to trade.   
18 Unexpected entry of institutions is measured as the residual from the following regression (following Chiang, 
Qian and Sherman (2009) Table 3): log(number of institutional bidders) = b1 + b2*log(assets) + b3*VC ownership + 
b4*P/E ratio + b5*High tech dummy + b6*TSE dummy + b7*% shares auctioned  + b8*Market  volatility  + b9*recent 
auction return + ε. Unexpected entry of individuals is similarly measured. 
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bids optimally, whereas individual investors as a group do not bid optimally.  
 For individual bidders, the coefficient on our main test variable, bidder experience, 
is -0.0155 for all bidders and -0.0187 for frequent bidders only, both significant at the 5% level. 
As experience increases by one standard deviation (0.87 for all individual bidders and 0.95 for 
frequent individual bidders), the expected return decreases by 1.3% for the sample of all 
individual bidders and by 1.8% for the sample of frequent individual bidders.   
 In contrast, experience has no effect on returns for institutional investors. The coefficient 
on experience is 0.0026 (t = 0.22) for the sample of all institutional investors and -0.0006 (t 
= -0.06) for the sample of frequent institutional bidders. The difference in the coefficient on 
experience between individual and institutional investors (for either the ‘all’ or ‘frequent bidders’ 
samples) is significant at the 5% level.  
In an alternative regression specification, we define the dependent variable to be a 
positive return dummy which equals one if the bidder earns a positive return and zero for a 
negative return, and estimate a logit regression of this dummy on experience. The results lead to 
similar conclusions about the effect of experience.   
As additional robustness checks, we use dummies for different auction orders (2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 5th, and 6th and higher) instead of log(auction order). We find that for individual investors, 
the coefficients on these dummies are all negative, suggesting that returns of bidders’ higher-
order auctions are lower than those of their 1st auctions. With 5 test variables, the degrees of 
freedom and therefore the power to identify effects is reduced. Nevertheless, for the full sample 
of individual bidders, the coefficients are significant for dummies of auction order =2 and ≥6; for 
frequent individual bidders, the coefficients are significant on all auction order dummies. In 
contrast, for both samples of institutional investors, none of the coefficients on auction order 
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dummies is significant.   
We also performed tests that include auction fixed-effects. This removes variation in 
investors’ return that derive from their decisions about which auctions to participate in, leaving 
only variations in return that derive from the choice of how aggressively to bid within an auction. 
As before, we find that the coefficients on auction order variables are in general significantly 
negative for samples of individual investors, but they are insignificant for samples of institutional 
investors. The magnitudes of these coefficients for samples of individuals become smaller, which 
can be explained by the fact that auction fixed-effects remove the effects of bidders’ auction 
selection ability.  
 In summary, our results show that returns to individual investors decrease as they 
participate in more auctions, whereas the returns to institutional investors do not. For individual 
investors, the evidence is consistent with naïve reinforcement learning (Hypothesis 3A), and 
inconsistent with rational learning (Hypothesis 2A).19 In sharp contrast, there is little evidence of 
naïve reinforcement learning on the part of institutional investors.   
 
6. Effects of experience on auction selection and bid aggressiveness 
 In this section, we explore why returns decline with bidding experience for individual 
investors but not for institutional investors. As discussed in Sherman (2005), Chiang, Qian and 
Sherman (2009) and Jagannathan, Jirnyi and Sherman (2010), to ensure an adequate return from 
IPO auctions, bidders need two types of skills: the ability to judge firm quality (i.e., to select the 
right auctions) and the expertise to shave bids adequately (so as to avoid the winner’s curse and 
                                                 
19 There are other theories of bias in learning processes, such as the hypothesis that investors overweight information 
that suggests that they are skillful (as modeled in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and 
Odean (2001)). We do not rule out the possibility that other forms of learning bias could help explain our 
findings. Even if so, investors would still be ‘learning to fail’ rather than learning to succeed as implied by rational 
learning. 
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to compensate for information costs). We therefore examine whether and how these two types of 
bidder skills change as bidders gain more experience (Hypothesis 2B vs. Hypothesis 3B/3C).  
 
6.1 Auction selection ability  
We first examine the effect of experience on auction selection ability. We regress the 
measure of auction selection ability – other bidders’ return (i.e., the value-weighted average 
return to other bidders in an auction in which bidder i bids) – on bidder i’s experience measured 
by the natural log of auction order. 20 If auction selection ability improves with experience, we 
expect to see a positive regression coefficient on experience. We include the same control 
variables as those in Table 6.   
 Table 7 Panel A reports the regression results for individual investors, institutional 
investors, frequent individual investors and frequent institutional investors separately. For 
individual investors, the coefficient on experience is negative for both samples and significant at 
the 10% level for the frequent-bidder sample. For both samples of institutional investors, the 
coefficient on experience is positive but insignificant. The difference in the coefficient on 
experience between the samples (all or frequent bidders) of individual and institutional investors 
is significant at the 5% level. The results provide some evidence that individual investors’ 
selection abilities decrease with experience, but no such evidence for institutional investors. 
 It can be argued that a bidder may be more certain about her information on firm quality 
when she bids more aggressively and wins shares; hence these auctions better reflect her 
selection ability than auctions in which she participates but does not win.  In Table 7 Panel B, we 
estimate the same regressions including only auctions in which the current bidder (bidder i) wins. 
                                                 
20 Results are robust with respect to the use of an alternative measure for bidder i’s auction selection ability, the ratio 
of the closing price on the first non-hit day over the reservation price in the auction in which she participates. This 
measures the ‘underpricing’ of the shares at the reservation price.  
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This time we find that the coefficient on experience is significantly negative for individual 
bidders (for both the overall sample and the frequent-bidder sample), suggesting that their 
selection ability gets worse as they participate in more auctions.  
In contrast, the coefficient for institutional bidders remains insignificant (for both the 
overall and the frequent-bidder samples), suggesting that institutional bidders’ selection abilities 
do not depend on how many IPO auctions they have participated in before. The coefficient on 
experience is more negative for the sample of all (frequent) individual bidders than for all 
(frequent) institutional bidders, with significance at the 5% (10%) level.   
 We also estimate auction-level regressions as a robustness check. The dependent variable 
is an auction’s weighted average return. The main variables of interest are the average 
experiences of individual and institutional bidders in the auction. The average experience of 
individual (institutional) investors is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the average 
number of previous auctions for individual (institutional) investors. We also include control 
variables as in Table 7 Panel A.   
 Results are reported in Table 7 Panel C. In the first specification, we calculate average 
experience of all individual (institutional) investors that bid in the auction. In the second 
specification, we calculate average experience of all winning individual (institutional) bidders.   
The coefficient on average experience of individuals is negative in both cases and significant at 
the 5% level where only winning bidders’ experience is considered. The coefficient on average 
experience of institutional investors is insignificantly positive for both specifications. In the 
second specification, the coefficient on average experience for individuals is significantly more 
negative than that on average experience for institutions. 
 Overall, we find some evidence that individual investors’ auction selection ability 
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declines with experience, consistent with the notion that individual investors learn to become 
reckless and unselective from their previous auction experience (i.e., Hypothesis 3B). In contrast, 
institutional investors’ selection ability does not change significantly with experience.  
 
6.2 Bid aggressiveness 
Next we examine whether and how an investor’s tendency to bid a high price (which we 
call bid aggressiveness) changes as she participates in more auctions. We measure bid 
aggressiveness as the percentile of a bidder’s bid price out of all bids (including losing bids) in 
an auction.21 We also use auction-mean (or median) adjusted bid premia as alternative measures 
for bid aggressiveness, and the results are similar.22 We relate bid aggressiveness to the bidder’s 
experience measured as the natural log of auction order, and include the same control variables 
as in Table 7.   
Table 8 reports the regression results for individual investors, institutional investors, 
frequent individual investors and frequent institutional investors separately. For individual 
bidders, the coefficient on experience is 5.95 for all bidders and 3.00 for frequent bidders only, 
both significant at the 1% level. As the explanatory variable increases by one standard deviation 
(0.87 for the sample of all individual bidders and 0.95 for the sample of frequent individual 
bidders), an individual bidder’s bid increases by 5.2 percentiles for the sample of all individual 
bidders and by 2.9 for the sample of frequent individual bidders. In the average auction, one 
percentile increase in bid price (relative to clearing price) has a mean of 0.6%. That the 
                                                 
21 For bidders with multiple bids, we use their quantity-weighted average bid price. 
22 As these are discriminatory or pay-what-you-bid auctions, there is no free rider problem.  In uniform price or 
`Dutch’ auctions, on the other hand,  the free rider problem might lead some investors to bid unrealistically high 
amounts simply to be ‘first in line’ (see Sherman, 2005). 
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coefficient is smaller for the frequent bidder sample suggests that frequent bidders on average 
tend to bid more aggressively than one-time bidders regardless of their bidding histories.  
In contrast, institutional investors do not bid more aggressively as they participate in 
more auctions. The coefficient on experience is insignificant for the sample of all institutional 
investors, and significantly negative for the sample of frequent institutional bidders. The 
difference in the coefficient on experience between the samples (all or frequent bidders) of 
individual versus institutional investors is significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, in regressions 
using auction order dummies instead of log(auction order), similar conclusions apply.  
 In summary, we find evidence that individual investors become less selective in entering 
an auction as they gain more experience. Moreover, they tend to bid more aggressively in their 
later auctions. These results are consistent with the predictions of naïve reinforcement learning 
(Hypotheses 3B and 3C).23 Institutional investors’ bidding abilities, in contrast, do not deteriorate 
as they participate in more auctions.  
 
6.3 Dollar profits 
 An alternative explanation for individual investors’ declining returns with experience is 
that they bid more aggressively to obtain a greater allocation of shares and therefore earn higher 
dollar profits despite lower percentage returns.  This hypothesis does not explain the previous 
evidence that auction selection ability declines with experience. Nevertheless, we now examine 
the relationship between dollar profits and bidder experience.  
Table 9 reports the mean and median values of bid size (in Panel A), investment size (i.e., 
winning size) (in Panel B) and dollar profits (in Panel C) by auction order, excluding the outlier 
                                                 
23 The bid aggression result is potentially consistent with rational learning as well, although this is not one of our 
formal hypotheses (see footnote 6). 
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auction Chung Hwa. For individual investors, we saw some evidence that bid size increases with 
auction order, i.e., the differences in median bid size for 2nd vs. 1st, 3rd vs. 2nd, and 6th and higher 
order vs. 5th are significantly positive although none of the differences is significant for mean bid 
size.  However, there is no evidence that their investment size (or winning size) increases.   
Table 9 Panel C suggests that individual investors’ dollar profits decrease as investors’ 
experience increases. For example, the mean dollar profit of their first auction is NT$543,400 
while that of their 2nd auction is NT$329,540, the difference significant at the 1% level. The 
mean dollar profit of auctions with 6th or greater auction order is NT$147,460, significantly 
higher than that of 5th auctions. The median values of dollar profits are much smaller than the 
mean values, suggesting the distribution of the variable is highly skewed. Nonetheless, the 
pattern is similar: the median dollar profits steadily decrease with auction order, with the 
differences significant at the 5% level for 3rd vs. 2nd (a difference of NT$23,650), 4th vs. 3rd (a 
difference of NT$16,250), and higher-order vs. 5th (a difference of NT$4,950). These differences 
are economically meaningful compared to the median dollar profits of NT$1,016 for the whole 
sample. In contrast, for institutional investors, we do not observe any obvious patterns in bid 
size, investment size or dollar profits as auction order increases.  
We then estimate a multivariate regression of dollar profits on bidder experience, 
controlling for auction characteristics and market conditions. Since dollar-profits are highly 
skewed, we use median regression, which is less sensitive to non-normality than OLS 
regressions. (Unreported OLS tests lead to the same conclusions about the effect of experience).  
Table 10 presents the regression results separately for all individual investors, all 
institutional investors, frequent individual investors, and frequent institutional investors. For both 
individual investor samples, the coefficient on experience is significantly negative, suggesting 
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dollar profits decrease with bidder experience. The coefficient is -5.4470 for all bidders and -
7.7475 for frequent bidders only. As experience increases by one standard deviation (0.87 for all 
individual bidders and 0.95 for frequent individual bidders), individuals investors’ dollar profits 
decrease by NT$4,630 for the sample of all individual bidders and NT$7,360 for frequent 
individual bidders. In contrast, for both institutional investor samples, the coefficient on 
experience is insignificant, suggesting that institutional investors’ dollar profits do not depend on 
experience.   
The evidence that individual investors’ dollar profits decrease with experience is 
consistent with naïve reinforcement learning leading to suboptimal bidding strategies in 
subsequent auctions. It is not consistent with the alternative hypothesis that individual investors 
follow optimal bidding strategies, which would imply non-decreasing dollar profits.  
 
7. Do bidders ever learn to be rational? 
 Our tests thus suggest that investors are subject to naïve reinforcement learning, leading 
over time to less selective auction participation and more aggressive bidding, and thus lower 
returns. A natural question is whether this perverse ‘learning to fail’ phenomenon ever reverses 
or at least levels off, given enough experience. We would expect leveling off to occur, since 
experiments on reinforcement learning find that the learning curve is initially steep and then 
flattens as experience increases (Roth and Erev, 1995). In this section, we further examine 
whether and/or when bidders in IPO auctions stop naïve learning. 
 For this purpose, we add a quadratic term of experience to our main tests (those in Tables 
6, 7, and 8).  That is, we run regressions of returns, auction selection ability, and bid 
aggressiveness on auction order and auction order squared.  If individual bidders’ naïve learning 
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levels off or even reverses itself, we expect the coefficient on the squared term to be of the 
opposite sign to that on the linear term. If the strength of naïve learning does not decline, the 
coefficient on the squared term should be insignificant.   
 Table 11 presents the new regression results for the following dependent variables: bidder 
return (Panel A), auction selection ability (Panel B), and bid aggressiveness (Panel C).  For 
brevity, we only report results of variables of interest and not those of control variables. Results 
suggest that individual bidders eventually learn. In Panel A, for the sample of all individual 
bidders, returns are negatively associated with auction order (the coefficient is -0.0048) and 
positively related with auction order squared (the coefficient is 0.0001). This suggests that 
returns first decline with experience, but that this effect levels off, and may eventually turn to 
increase with experience if experience is long enough.  
The point at which the marginal effect of auction order becomes zero is when the auction 
order is 24 (i.e. when -0.0048 + 2*0.0001*auction order = 0). This implies that it takes around 
24 auctions for individual bidders to reverse their naïve reinforcement learning and start to 
benefit from experience. This is a considerable amount of experience. In our sample, only 0.2% 
individual bidders’ highest auction orders are no less than 24.  The results are very similar for the 
sample of frequent individual bidders.   
In contrast, institutional investors’ returns are not significantly related to either auction 
order or auction order squared.  In unreported results, we also use dollar profits as the dependent 
variable. Results are similar in that individual bidders’ dollar profits decline with experience 
until auction order reaches 19 (for the sample of all individual bidders) or 18 (for the sample of 
frequent individual bidders), and that institutional bidders’ dollar profits do not depend on 
experience.  
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 In Panel B, bidders’ auction selection ability declines with experience until auction order 
reaches 14 (for the sample of all individual bidders) or 19 (for the sample of frequent individual 
bidders). In unreported results, we examine the auction selection abilities of only winning 
bidders. For both samples of individual bidders, the coefficient on auction order is significantly 
negative and that on auction order squared is positive but insignificant, suggesting that 
experience in our sample is not long enough to identify any long-run improvement in bidders’ 
auction selection abilities. The results in Panel C show that bid aggressiveness increases with 
experience until auction order reaches 20 for both samples of individual investors. In contrast, 
Panels B and C show that institutional investors’ auction selection abilities and bid 
aggressiveness do not depend on experience.  
 In summary, results in Table 11 suggest that, consistent with theory, individual investors’ 
naïve reinforcement learning levels off. These bidders may eventually learn to be more rational, 
given long enough experience; however, for most bidders who have participated in limited 
numbers of IPO auctions, past successful experience leads them to unduly optimistic 
expectations and causes them to follow suboptimal bidding strategies. Institutional investors’ 
bidding strategies and performance, on the other hand, do not seem to depend on past experience.   
 
8. Conclusion 
We examine how bidding experience affects a bidder’s decision to participate in an IPO 
auction, as well as the resulting return performance. Individual investors are more likely to bid in 
the future if they receive high returns from their previous IPO auctions. However, their returns 
steadily decline as they participate in more auctions. Regression results show that as experience 
increases by one standard deviation, the expected return decreases by 1.3% (1.8%) and the 
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expected dollar profits decrease by NT$4,630 (7,360) for the sample of all individual investors 
(for individuals engaged in repeat bidding). Furthermore, as individual investors gain more 
experience, their auction selection ability deteriorates, and they become more aggressive in the 
levels of their bids.  
This evidence indicates that individual investors are subject to naïve reinforcement 
learning. When individual investors receive high returns from previous auctions, they become 
more optimistic about receiving high returns from future auctions, making them more likely to 
participate in future auctions and to bid more aggressively.   
In sharp contrast, there is little sign that institutional bidders are subject to this bias. Their 
decisions to participate in an IPO auction are unrelated to their past returns. Furthermore, their 
returns do not decline with experience as they bid in more auctions, and their auction selection 
and bid shaving abilities do not deteriorate with experience.  
Teachers often tell their students that the important thing that education provides is not a 
given set of facts, but an ability to ‘learn how to learn’. Overall our findings indicate that 
individual investors do not know how to learn from their past experience (at least not from even 
fairly long experience), and naively overweight their personal experiences. However, a more 
optimistic message from this paper is that it may be possible for investors to avoid ‘learning to 
fail’, as reflected in the fact that institutional investors do not seem to be subject to naïve 
reinforcement learning. A direction for future research is to understand what it is about 
institutional managers that makes them better at avoiding pernicious pseudo-learning, and 
whether there are ways to help individual investors, despite their more limited resources, to train 
themselves to improve their learning skills. 
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Appendix A  
Variable Definition 
 
Variables Definition 
Auction order  An auction is a bidder’s 1st (2nd, 3rd, etc.) auction if the bidder has 0 (1, 2, etc) 
previous IPO auctions.  An auction is counted as a previous auction if its first 
non-hit day occurs before the current auction’s auction date.  
Initial return The closing price of the first non-hit day over the winning price minus one.  
VC ownership  The percentage of shares held by venture capitalists prior to the IPO.   
P/E  The ratio of the reservation price of the auction to the annual earnings per share 
prior to the IPO. 
High-tech dummy  The dummy equals one if the firm is categorized as in electronic sector by the 
exchange and zero otherwise.   
TSE dummy  The dummy equals one if the firm is listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange and zero 
otherwise.  
% of shares auctioned 
  
The number of shares to be auctioned divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding.   
Market volatility  The standard deviation of daily market returns during the three months prior to the 
auction day.   
Recent auction return  The weighted average initial return of IPO auctions for which returns have been 
observed, with weights based on (720 – N) (zero weight if 720 – N < 0), where N 
is the number of days between a previous auction’s first non-hit day and the 
current auction’s auction day. An auction is counted as a previous auction if its 
first non-hit date occurs before the current auction’s auction date.  
Unexpected entry of institutions 
(individuals)  
The unexpected number of institutional (individual) bidders as constructed in 
Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009).   
Bid premium of institutions 
(individuals)  
The quantity-weighted average bidding price of all institutional (individual) bids 
(including losing bids) relative to the reservation price. 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics 
 
The sample includes 84 IPO-auctions in Taiwan during 1995-2000.  Panel A reports firm characteristics.  NT$ refers 
to New Taiwan Dollars.  All NT$ values are deflated to constant year 2000 NT$.  The exchange rate at the end of 
year 2000 is US$1 = NT$32.99.  Panel B shows by year the average initial returns of these IPO auctions.  We 
compute the initial return for each auction as the closing price on the first non-hit day over the quantity-weighted 
average of the winning price. Panels C and D report bidder activities and returns.  Panel C treats each bidder-auction 
combination as an observation.  Panel D treats each unique bidder as an observation (the mean values are obtained 
by first averaging across auctions for each bidder then averaging across bidders).  
 
Panel A. IPO auction firm characteristics, N=84 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75%
% of IPOs on TSE 55.95
% of IPOs in high tech industry 53.57
Assets (in millions of NT$) 10,382.46 1,936.35 49,900.46 1,189.78 3,414.02
Auction proceeds (in millions of NT$)) 880.58 417.72 2522.74 149.87 886.28
VC ownership (%) 13.46 6.82 16.24 0.00 23.18
P/E 18.34 16.24 13.26 11.82 20.11
% of shares auctioned 6.51 6.65 2.88 3.75 9.81
 
Panel B. IPO initial returns, N=84 
  All 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
IPO initial return (%) 7.25 6.82 35.46 0.72 4.21 11.98 -11.51
IPO initial return – individuals (%) 7.19 6.82 35.89 0.36 4.01 12.18 -11.54
IPO initial return – institutions (%) 8.70 . 37.03 3.34 5.31 15.15 -11.31
# of individual bidders per auction 676.77 235 1,595.27 763.05 373.52 452.87 771.44
# of institutional bidders per auction 31.99 2 49.82 24.37 27.45 33.73 41.33
# of IPO auctions 84 1 11 19 29 15 9
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Panel C. Bidder activities and returns (bidder-auction observations) 
  Individuals Institutions Difference  
N (# of bidder-auction obs.) 56,849 2,687  
Average NT$ bid size (in thousands) 2,343.32 23,144.97 -20,801.7*** 
Average NT$ investments (winning size) (in thousands) 2,857.78 28,306.70 -25,448.9*** 
Mean initial return (%) 5.50% 11.54% -6.04%*** 
Median initial return (%) 0 4.61% -4.61%*** 
Standard deviation of initial return (%) 22.83% 26.08%  
Minimum initial return (%) -50.00% -33.77%  
Maximum initial return (%) 110.59% 110.59%  
% of positive initial returns 49.44% 64.09%  
 
Panel D. Bidder activities and returns (at the level of unique bidder) 
  Individuals Institutions Difference  
N (# of bidders) 31,476 1,232  
Average # of IPO auctions 1.81 2.18 -0.37*** 
Average # of winning IPO auctions 0.51 0.79 -0.28*** 
Mean NT$ bid size (in thousands) 2,325.05 27,732.80 -25,407.75*** 
Mean NT$ investments (winning size) (in thousands) 2,822.16 34,328.88 -31,506.72*** 
Mean value-weighted initial return (%) 3.71% 10.87% -7.17%*** 
Median value-weighted initial return (%) -3.37% 4.22% -7.59%*** 
Mean dollar profits per auction (thousands) 218.23 1,309.20 -1,090.97* 
Median dollar profits per auction (thousands) -17.50 295.91 -313.41*** 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics: Past return and probability of subsequent bidding 
 
The sample is divided into two halves with similar numbers of winning bidder-auction observations. The first half of 
the sample includes 44 (out of 84) auctions and 8,442 (out of 17,008) winning bidder-auction observations. A 
bidder’s past return in the first half is the investment-weighted average of her initial returns from all the auctions she 
wins shares during that period. Return quintiles are determined for all bidders together. 
Panel A. Probability of bidding in the second period by return quintile in the first period 
  Individuals  Institutions 
  Return Quartile N 
Avg. Past 
Return 
Prob. of 
bidding.   N 
Avg. Past 
Return 
Prob. of 
bidding 
 Lowest 1,200 -8.93% 29.83%  41 -6.57% 46.34% 
 2 1,131 5.26% 38.46%  111 5.64% 37.84% 
 3 1,185 17.81% 41.86%  57 16.84% 43.86% 
  Highest 1,167 47.89% 40.02%   74 63.39% 47.30% 
Panel B. Probability of bidding in the second period by number of auctions and return quintile in the first period 
  Individuals  Institutions 
# of auctions 
In the first 
half 
Return 
Quartile N 
Avg. Past 
Return 
Prob. of 
bidding  N 
Avg. Past 
Return 
Prob. of 
bidding 
1 Lowest 660 -9.59% 18.64%  31 -6.49% 45.16% 
 2 660 4.86% 26.52%  68 5.59% 22.06% 
 3 757 18.19% 30.38%  30 17.11% 33.33% 
 Highest 930 51.32% 33.66%  55 67.90% 40.00% 
         
2 Lowest 172 -8.78% 28.49%  5 -12.09% 60.00% 
 2 123 5.31% 43.09%  19 5.61% 47.37% 
 3 132 17.66% 60.61%  8 14.91% 62.50% 
 Highest 105 35.77% 60.95%  4 66.99% 75.00% 
         
≥3 Lowest 368 -7.81% 50.54%  5 -1.57% 40.00% 
 2 348 5.98% 59.48%  24 5.80% 75.00% 
 3 296 16.89% 62.84%  19 17.24% 52.63% 
  Highest 132 33.40% 68.18%   15 45.93% 66.67% 
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Table 3 
Logit regressions: Past return and probability of subsequent bidding 
 
Panel A reports the results of a two-subsample analysis. The sample is divided into two halves so that the two 
subsamples have similar numbers of winning bidder-auction observations. The first subsample includes 44 (out of 
84) auctions and 8,442 (out of 17,008) winning bidder-auction observations. The dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if a bidder bids again in the second period. A bidder’s past return is the investment-weighted average of 
her initial returns from all the auctions she wins shares in the first period. Panels B and C use all winning bidder-
auction observations, excluding those of the last two auctions since there are no future auctions after them in our 
sample. Past return is a bidder’s investment-weighted average initial return up through the current auction. In Panel 
B, the dependent variable equals one if the bidder ever bids again in our sample after winning the current auction 
and zero otherwise.  In Panel C, the dependent variable equals to one if the bidder bids again in the next auction and 
zero otherwise.  All other control variables in Panel C reflect the next auction’s characteristics. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 
Panel A.  Two-subsample analysis: the dependent variable equals one if the bidder bids again in the second period 
and zero otherwise. 
Individuals Institutions
Estimates t Estimates t 
Past return 1.3068 10.89*** 0.4256 1.04 
Log(1+# of auctions in 
1st period) 0.8425 20.01*** 0.7996 4.16 *** 
Intercept -1.1760 -25.27*** -0.7381 -4.12 *** 
Log likelihood -2,849.64***  -183.59***  
Pseudo R2  0.08  0.05  
N 4,683  283  
 
Panel B. The dependent variable equals one if the bidder bids again in our sample after winning the current auction 
and zero otherwise.  
Individuals Institutions
Estimates t Estimates t 
Past return 1.1142 10.34*** -0.0012 0.00 
Log(1+# of past auctions) 1.1078 39.36*** 1.0277 8.30 *** 
Intercept -0.5174 -1.64 0.8174 3.28 *** 
Year dummies yes  yes  
Log likelihood -6,742.55***  -454.31***  
Pseudo R2  0.37  0.31  
N 15,881  959  
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Panel C. The dependent variable equals one if the bidder bids in the next IPO and zero otherwise. 
Individuals Institutions
Estimates t Estimates t 
Past return 0.6226 3.25*** 0.2730 0.39 
Log(1+# of past auctions) 0.8335 26.33*** 0.5506 3.46 *** 
Log(assets) 0.1430 2.29** 0.1933 0.60 
VC ownership 0.5864 2.32** 1.3687 1.20 
P/E 0.0149 5.44*** 0.0086 0.70 
High-tech dummy 1.3107 14.82*** 0.8488 2.13 ** 
TSE dummy 0.2637 2.15** 1.1132 2.15 ** 
% shares auctioned 5.1576 2.09** 9.2316 0.66 
Market volatility -318.1324 -16.16*** -285.9889 -2.72 *** 
Recent auction return -0.0115 -0.01 4.1440 1.03 
Intercept -2.1612 -2.08** -5.8583 -0.95 
Year dummies yes  yes  
Log likelihood -4,460.36***  -237.77***  
Pseudo R2  0.31  0.24  
N 15,881  959  
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Table 4 
Bidder returns by auction order 
 
This table shows the mean and median values of bidder initial returns by auction order. The column labeled as (nth-(n-1)th) shows the difference in mean or 
median returns in nth and (n-1)th auction order.  We use t-test for differences in means, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in medians. ***, **, 
and * denote the difference is significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Whole samples 
  Individuals Institutions 
  Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
Auction order N Return nth-(n-1)th Return nth-(n-1)th N Return nth-(n-1)th Return nth-(n-1)th 
1 10,366 5.22% -3.55% 613 11.45% 3.48%
2 1,559 10.89% 5.67%*** 7.80% 11.36%*** 108 12.26% 0.81% 7.83% 4.35%*** 
3 870 7.76% -3.13%*** 4.75% -3.05%*** 63 14.83% 2.57% 5.85% -1.97% 
4 547 4.75% -3.01%*** 2.82% -1.93%*** 50 13.30% -1.53% 6.33% 0.48% 
5 424 5.02% 0.27% 2.38% -0.44% 42 13.01% -0.29% 6.49% 0.16% 
≥6 2,271 2.48% -2.54% ** 1.59% -0.79% 95 7.56% -5.46% 4.99% -1.50% 
 
Panel B. Excluding the largest auction 
  Individuals Institutions 
  Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
Auction order N Return nth-(n-1)th Return nth-(n-1)th N Return nth-(n-1)th Return nth-(n-1)th 
1 6,307 14.21%  10.00%  422 19.83%  9.63%  
2 1,524 11.34% -2.88%*** 8.33% -1.68% 107 12.41% -7.43%*** 7.85% -1.78% 
3 870 7.76% -3.58%*** 4.75% -3.57%*** 63 14.83% 2.43% 5.85% -2.00% 
4 547 4.75% -3.01%*** 2.82% -1.93%*** 50 13.30% -1.53% 6.33% 0.48% 
5 424 5.02% 0.27% 2.38% -0.44% 42 13.01% -0.29% 6.49% 0.16% 
≥6 2,271 2.48% -2.54% ** 1.59% -0.79% 95 7.56% -5.46% 4.99% -1.50% 
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Table 5 
Change in return by auction order 
 
This table shows the mean and median values of a bidder’s own change in returns across auctions. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Individuals  Institutions 
Auction order N Mean Median   N Mean  Median  
2nd-1st 1,447 -12.91% *** -10.28%***  119 -12.33% *** -8.69%*** 
3rd-2nd 643 -7.59% *** -6.85%***  45 0.71% 0.07% 
4th-3rd 340 -4.11% *** -2.33%***  18 -8.85% -0.91% 
5th-4th 203 0.28% 0.24%  6 4.85% 1.26% 
≥6th-5th 339 -2.14% * -0.96%    9 -7.73%  -13.39%  
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Table 6 
Regressions: The effects of experience on returns 
 
The dependent variable is a bidder’s initial return in an auction. Frequent bidders are those whose highest auction order is more than one. t-statistics are adjusted 
for auction clustering and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Overall sample  Frequent Bidders 
Individuals  Institutions  Individuals  Institutions 
Independent variables Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t
Log(auction order) -0.0155 -2.34** 0.0026 0.22 -0.0187 -2.55** -0.0006 -0.06 
Log (assets) 0.0574 3.07*** 0.0861 3.90*** 0.0723 3.35*** 0.0871 3.08*** 
VC ownership -0.0780 -0.64 -0.0442 -0.37 -0.0645 -0.51 -0.0561 -0.49 
P/E -0.0044 -3.09*** -0.0056 -3.44*** -0.0059 -3.98*** -0.0059 -3.06*** 
High-tech dummy 0.2184 4.59*** 0.2750 5.64*** 0.2283 4.98*** 0.2385 5.19*** 
TSE dummy -0.1893 -2.97*** -0.2340 -2.98*** -0.1954 -2.74*** -0.2346 -2.38** 
% shares auctioned 2.4536 2.20** 3.2086 2.09** 2.2368 2.08** 2.9909 2.00* 
Market volatility 27.7903 2.22** 47.7255 2.62** 28.4687 2.11** 50.0980 2.85*** 
Recent auction return 0.1234 0.39 0.2265 0.52 0.1029 0.33 0.2427 0.59 
Unexpected entry of individuals -0.1280 -1.99* -0.1554 -2.52** -0.1691 -2.57** -0.2016 -3.12*** 
Bid premia of individuals -0.5940 -2.10** -1.0459 -2.83*** -0.7563 -2.14** -1.1941 -3.11*** 
Unexpected entry of institutions 0.0992 2.57** 0.1354 4.16*** 0.1189 3.11*** 0.1288 3.95*** 
Bid premia of institutions 0.6214 2.14** 1.1154 2.85*** 0.8480 2.33** 1.4400 3.80*** 
Intercept -1.6173 -2.95*** -1.6219 -2.39** -1.1880 -2.35** -1.8739 -3.05*** 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
R2 0.62 0.69 0.60 0.68
N 15,820 971 7,880 545
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Table 7 
The effects of experience on auction selection ability 
 
In Panel A (B), the dependent variable is the quantity-weighted average return of other bidders in an auction the current bidder participates (or wins). Frequent 
bidders are those whose highest auction order is greater than one. t-statistics are adjusted for auction clustering and heteroskedasticity. In Panel C, the dependent 
variable is the quantity-weighted average initial return for an auction.  Average auction order for individuals (institutions) is quantity-weighted average auction 
order. t-statistics are adjusted for  heteroskedasticity in Panel C. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. When the bidder bids 
 Overall samples Frequent bidders 
 Individuals Institutions Individuals Institutions 
Independent variables Estimates t  Estimates t  Estimates t  Estimates t  
Log(auction order) -0.0056 -0.95  0.0123 1.04  -0.0111 -1.73 * 0.0085 0.84  
Log (assets) 0.0652 2.87 *** 0.0841 3.72 *** 0.0726 2.73 *** 0.0856 3.00 *** 
VC ownership -0.2192 -1.29  -0.2291 -1.57  -0.1908 -1.05  -0.2212 -1.44  
P/E -0.0057 -4.15 *** -0.0059 -4.60 *** -0.0062 -3.94 *** -0.0058 -3.75 *** 
High-tech dummy 0.1801 3.45 *** 0.2175 4.34 *** 0.1693 3.28 *** 0.2058 3.98 *** 
TSE dummy -0.2420 -3.95 *** -0.2646 -3.58 *** -0.2338 -3.35 *** -0.2702 -3.25 *** 
% shares auctioned 2.9406 2.44 ** 2.9537 2.08 ** 3.0639 2.48 ** 3.1936 2.11 ** 
Market volatility -0.1038 -1.77 * -0.1196 -2.08 ** -0.1450 -2.42 ** -0.1420 -2.38 ** 
Recent auction return -0.6091 -1.74 * -0.9660 -2.51 ** -0.6347 -1.86 * -0.9980 -2.68 *** 
Unexpected entry of individuals 0.1232 3.69 *** 0.1441 4.17 *** 0.1273 3.75 *** 0.1435 4.31 *** 
Bid premia of individuals 0.6368 1.74 * 1.0331 2.41 ** 0.7496 2.07 ** 1.1646 2.98 *** 
Unexpected entry of institutions 25.0509 2.11 ** 26.8567 1.88 * 28.2732 2.40 ** 28.0833 2.18 ** 
Bid premia of institutions 0.1983 0.71  0.0157 0.05  0.2118 0.70  0.0323 0.12  
Intercept -1.6099 -2.84 *** -2.0425 -3.51 *** -1.8586 -3.38 *** -2.2686 -4.06 *** 
Year dummies yes   yes   yes   yes   
R2 0.66   0.62   0.65   0.62   
N 56,165   2,682   27,886   1,731   
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Panel B. When the bidder wins 
 Overall samples Frequent bidders 
 Individuals Institutions Individuals Institutions 
Independent variables Estimates t  Estimates t  Estimates t  Estimates t  
Log(auction order) -0.0119 -1.82 * 0.0021 0.19  -0.0152 -2.11 ** -0.0025 -0.27  
Log (assets) 0.0565 3.07 *** 0.0848 3.86 *** 0.0694 3.28 *** 0.0847 3.01 *** 
VC ownership -0.0748 -0.63  -0.0459 -0.37  -0.0469 -0.38  -0.0424 -0.37  
P/E -0.0043 -3.07 *** -0.0056 -3.50 *** -0.0058 -3.96 *** -0.0058 -3.10 *** 
High-tech dummy 0.2205 4.73 *** 0.2776 5.65 *** 0.2307 5.17 *** 0.2421 5.36 *** 
TSE dummy -0.1826 -2.90 *** -0.2262 -2.85 *** -0.1841 -2.62 ** -0.2213 -2.25 ** 
% shares auctioned 2.4219 2.17 ** 3.0683 2.00 ** 2.1202 1.96 * 2.8543 1.90 * 
Market volatility -0.1328 -2.17 ** -0.1530 -2.53 ** -0.1762 -2.83 *** -0.1986 -3.24 *** 
Recent auction return -0.5824 -2.14 ** -1.0776 -2.86 *** -0.7480 -2.23 ** -1.2365 -3.11 *** 
Unexpected entry of individuals 0.1006 2.71 *** 0.1334 4.13 *** 0.1200 3.25 *** 0.1285 4.00 *** 
Bid premia of individuals 0.6015 2.16 ** 1.1504 2.90 *** 0.8293 2.40 ** 1.4825 3.78 *** 
Unexpected entry of institutions 26.0815 2.10 ** 46.6306 2.61 ** 26.5065 2.01 ** 49.0621 2.84 *** 
Bid premia of institutions 0.1308 0.42  0.1904 0.44  0.1175 0.38  0.2284 0.57  
Intercept -1.5636 -2.93 *** -2.4767 -3.53 *** -1.7722 -3.34 *** -2.7160 -4.37 *** 
Year dummies yes  yes   yes  yes  
R2 0.64  0.71   0.62  0.70  
N 15,820  971   7,880  545  
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Panel C. Auction-level regressions 
 When the bidders bids (1) 
When the bidders wins 
(2) 
Independent variables Estimates t  Estimates t  
Log(average auction order for individuals) -0.0357 -0.62  -0.1332 -2.08 ** 
Log(average auction order for institutions) 0.0628 1.35  0.1041 1.60  
Log (assets) 0.0465 1.80 * 0.0352 1.44  
VC ownership -0.0673 -0.53  -0.0433 -0.28  
P/E -0.0030 -1.87 * -0.0026 -1.53  
High-tech dummy 0.1967 4.00 *** 0.2072 4.07 *** 
TSE dummy -0.1321 -1.71 * -0.1312 -1.64  
% shares auctioned 2.3937 1.58  1.8280 1.27  
Market volatility 18.7468 1.22  8.1836 0.57  
Recent auction return 0.2567 0.50  0.1419 0.27  
Unexpected entry of individuals -0.0769 -1.23  -0.0659 -0.96  
Bid premia of individuals -0.4058 -1.87 * -0.4847 -1.62  
Unexpected entry of institutions 0.0877 2.41 ** 0.1035 2.37 ** 
Bid premia of institutions 0.3943 1.59  0.4645 1.41  
Intercept -1.3244 -1.94 * -0.9125 -1.39  
Year dummies yes   yes   
R2 0.53   0.54   
N 80   75   
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Table 8 
Regressions: The effects of experience on bid aggressiveness 
 
The dependent variable is the percentile of a bidder’s bid price in an auction. Frequent bidders are those whose highest auction order is more than one. t-statistics 
are adjusted for auction clustering and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Overall sample  Frequent Bidders 
Individuals  Institutions  Individuals  Institutions 
Independent variables Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t 
Log(auction order) 5.9512 8.41*** 0.2558 0.27 3.0045 5.10*** -2.6188 -2.41** 
Log (assets) 0.4633 2.20** -1.2905 -1.35 1.1729 2.49** 1.9091 1.58 
VC ownership -0.9743 -0.90 4.6828 0.61 1.0118 0.31 -4.9323 -0.66 
P/E -0.0122 -1.08 0.0567 1.25 -0.004 -0.14 -0.0396 -0.89 
High-tech dummy -0.3022 -0.90 3.3359 1.42 2.3774 2.25** 3.7297 1.50 
TSE dummy -0.2277 -0.41 -0.5752 -0.22 1.018 1.00 -1.2576 -0.48 
% shares auctioned 11.3133 1.06 -44.8958 -0.87 -13.4392 -0.65 24.6489 0.54 
Market volatility 1.0576 2.09** 6.0325 2.39** 1.4617 1.55 6.7588 3.22*** 
Recent auction return 1.5418 0.66 -99.2375 -5.45*** -15.6421 -2.59** -115.4919 -6.51*** 
Unexpected entry of individuals -0.4929 -1.71* -1.6779 -0.77 0.5295 0.83 -0.5784 -0.33 
Bid premia of individuals -2.4408 -0.97 103.2498 5.74*** 15.3264 2.65** 113.8192 6.66*** 
Unexpected entry of institutions -65.448 -0.86 572.8137 1.15 -422.2514 -2.31** 312.6872 0.81 
Bid premia of institutions 3.8001 1.95* 11.7931 0.83 13.4022 3.19*** 22.3685 1.99* 
Intercept 42.1041 8.64*** 56.1617 2.31** 35.5223 3.95*** 15.0381 0.64 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
R2 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.11
N 56,165 2,682 27,886 1,731
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Table 9 
Bid size, investment size, and dollar profits by auction order 
 
This table shows the mean and median values of bidders’ bid size, investment size, and dollar profits by auction order. The sample excludes the largest auction 
Chung Hwa. The column labeled as (nth-(n-1)th) shows the difference in mean or median returns in nth and (n-1)th auction order.  We use t-tests for differences 
in means, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for differences in medians. ***, **, and * denote the difference is significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A. Bid size (in thousands of NT$) 
  Individuals Institutions 
  Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
Auction order N Bid size nth-(n-1)th Bid size nth-(n-1)th N Bid size nth-(n-1)th Bid size nth-(n-1)th 
1 34,146 2,245.94  603.77  1,324 19,833.36  12,046.15  
2 6,129 2,336.16 90.22 759.38 155.61*** 366 20,320.75 487.39 11,214.13 -832.02 
3 2,987 2,555.65 219.49 843.82 84.44*** 187 18,309.11 -2011.64 10,631.25 -582.88 
4 1,770 2,551.47 -4.18 850.43 6.61 166 18,341.58 32.47 10,848.18 216.93 
5 1,317 2,591.62 40.15 803.54 -46.89 120 18,129.11 -212.47 12,224.11 1,375.93 
≥6 6,406 2,809.51 217.89 924.60 121.06*** 332 17,322.72 -806.39 13,127.74 903.63 
 
Panel B. Investment size (in thousands of NT$) 
  Individuals Institutions 
  Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
Auction order N Investments nth-(n-1)th Investments nth-(n-1)th N Investments nth-(n-1)th Investments nth-(n-1)th 
1 6,307 3,435.72  878.83  422 18,432.43  9,876.46  
2 1,524 2,758.46 -677.26*** 762.19 -116.64* 107 17,133.54 -1,298.89 10,631.25 754.79 
3 870 2,751.72 -6.74 795.05 32.86 63 12,098.96 -5,034.58** 7,971.41 -2,659.84 
4 547 2,643.06 -108.66 833.06 38.01 50 18,764.20 6,665.24** 11,893.14 3,921.73** 
5 424 3,216.36 573.30 818.17 -14.89 42 14,501.37 -4,262.83 11,556.65 -336.49 
≥6 2,271 2,689.22 -527.14 817.97 -0.20 95 15,430.62 929.25 11,694.63 137.98 
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Panel C. Dollar profits (in thousands of NT$) 
  Individuals Institutions 
  Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
Auction order N Dollar profits nth-(n-1)th Dollar profits nth-(n-1)th N Dollar profits nth-(n-1)th Dollar profits nth-(n-1)th 
1 6,307 543.40  60.75  422 4,610.81  950.80  
2 1,524 329.54 -213.86*** 56.94 -3.81 107 3,115.64 -1,495.17 733.69 -217.11 
3 870 260.30 -69.24 33.29 -23.65*** 63 2,453.06 -662.58 273.38 -460.31* 
4 547 236.88 -23.42 17.04 -16.25** 50 3,441.28 988.22 778.48 505.11 
5 424 317.32 80.44 13.05 -3.99 42 1,778.34 -1,662.94 725.06 -53.43 
≥6 2,271 147.46 -169.86** 8.10 -4.95** 95 1,306.03 -472.31 412.55 -312.51 
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Table 10 
Median Regressions for dollar profits: The effects of experience on dollar profits 
 
The dependent variable is a bidder’s dollar profits in an auction, i.e., investment size times initial return. Frequent bidders are those whose highest auction order is more than one.  
t-statistics are adjusted for auction clustering and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Overall sample  Frequent Bidders 
Individuals  Institutions  Individuals  Institutions 
Independent variables Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t
Log(auction order) -5.4470 -3.84*** 36.3292 0.64 -7.7475 -4.67*** 22.3191 0.23 
Log(assets) 37.7695 25.63*** 787.0505 15.64*** 49.4512 22.55*** 1259.6710 11.24*** 
VC ownership 15.7672 1.64 -1490.7790 -4.18*** 15.0581 1.37 -1416.2110 -2.37** 
P/E -1.8515 -16.36*** -69.2265 -18.45*** -2.5886 -18.91*** -80.0369 -12.80*** 
High-tech dummy 79.6846 24.59*** 2368.0100 19.16*** 84.0266 22.30*** 2040.2010 9.53*** 
TSE dummy -74.2561 -15.57*** -2081.5730 -12.65*** -80.0176 -13.92*** -2376.9390 -7.93*** 
% shares auctioned 947.4032 11.47*** 3338.2380 1.25 1183.6440 11.73*** 3058.8440 0.64 
Market volatility 13295.18 18.80*** 487665.00 21.19*** 16435.850 18.54*** 442270.50 10.88*** 
Recent auction return 194.6996 9.16*** -5927.1910 -5.37*** 325.5947 13.55*** -7967.4800 -4.50*** 
Unexpected entry of individuals -10.9436 -3.62*** -1535.2340 -14.70*** -39.2105 -10.92*** -1626.2450 -8.71*** 
Bid premia of individuals -407.2802 -19.51*** -18336.500 -18.36*** -330.2830 -13.15*** -18228.290 -11.16*** 
Unexpected entry of institutions 27.5339 11.15*** 1215.7710 13.20*** 41.8533 13.55*** 1095.0090 6.81*** 
Bid premia of institutions 417.1846 20.95*** 20647.900 21.66*** 414.2863 17.10*** 21775.610 14.04*** 
Intercept -789.7214 -24.06*** -12859.730 -11.28*** -1454.1980 -33.12*** -20707.410 -9.81*** 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
R2 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.18
N 15,820 971 7,880 545
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Table 11 
Quadratic regressions 
 
The dependent variable is a bidder’s initial return in Panel A, or others bidders’ return in Panel B, or the percentile of bid price in Panel C. t-statistics are adjusted for auction 
clustering and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.    
 
Overall sample  Frequent Bidders 
Individuals  Institutions  Individuals  Institutions 
Independent variables Estimates t Estimates t  Estimates t Estimates t
Panel A, Bidders’ initial return 
Auction order -0.0048 -2.32** -0.0016 -0.31  -0.0049 -2.34** -0.0025 -0.63 
Auction order squared 0.0001 2.06** 0.0002 0.81  0.0001 1.92* 0.0002 0.92 
Control variables as those 
in Table 6 yes yes  yes yes
R2 0.62 0.70  0.60 0.69
N 15,820 971  7,880 545
Panel B, Auction selection ability measured by other bidders’ returns, when the current bidder bids 
Auction order -0.0028 -1.53 0.0038 0.92  -0.0038 -2.18** 0.0015 0.43 
Auction order squared 0.0001 2.00** -0.0001 -0.70  0.0001 2.33** 0.0000 -0.05 
Control variables as those 
in Table 7A yes  yes   yes  yes  
R2 0.66  0.62   0.65  0.62  
N  
Panel C, Bid aggressiveness 
Auction order 1.8791 7.61*** 0.5866 1.53  0.8817 5.06*** -0.2468 -0.62 
Auction order squared -0.0463 -6.62*** -0.0377 -3.15***  -0.0222 -4.84*** -0.0151 -1.21 
Control variables as those
in Table 8 yes  yes   yes  yes  
R2 0.02  0.10   0.01  0.11  
N 56,165  2,682   27,886  1,731  
 
 
  
